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I. Introduction
In this paper we model U.S. labor supply and demand in considerable 
detail in order to capture the enormous heterogeneity of the labor force 
and its evolution over the next 25 years. We represent labor supplies for a 
large number of demographic groups as responses to prices of leisure and 
consumption goods and services. The price of leisure is an after-tax wage 
rate, while the ﬁ  nal prices of goods and services reﬂ  ect the supply prices 
of the industries that produce them. By including demographic character-
istics among the determinants of household preferences, we incorporate 
the expected demographic transition into our long-run projections of the 
U.S. labor market. 
The U.S. population will be growing older over the next quarter-cen-
tury, and elderly households have very different patterns of labor supply 
and consumption compared to their younger counterparts. Our projec-
tions for the period spanning 2004 to 2030 thus incorporate the expected 
fall in the supply of labor per capita. These changes in labor supply pat-
terns are the consequence of population aging, rather than wage and 
income effects. Despite the anticipated aging of the U.S. population, 
moderate population growth will provide growing supplies of labor well 
into the twenty-ﬁ  rst century. Improvements in the quality of U.S. labor 
input, deﬁ  ned as increased average levels of educational attainment and 
experience, will also continue for some time, but will gradually disappear 
over the next quarter-century.
We represent labor demand for each of 35 industrial sectors of the U.S. 
economy as a response to the prices of productive inputs—labor, capital, Labor Supply and Labor Demand in the Long Run 282
and intermediate goods and services. In addition, labor demand is driven 
by changes in technology. Technical change generates productivity growth 
within each industry. Rates of productivity growth differ widely among 
industries, ranging from the blistering pace of advance in computers and 
electronic components to the gradual decline in construction and petro-
leum reﬁ  ning. In addition, changes in technology may be skill-biased. 
Labor-saving technical change reduces labor demand for given input 
prices, while labor-using technological change increases labor demand.
Over the next 25 years, productivity growth for the U.S. economy as a 
whole will be below long-term historical averages. However, productivity 
growth in information technology equipment and software will continue 
to outpace productivity growth in the rest of the economy.  The output of 
the U.S. economy will continue to shift toward industries with high rates 
of productivity growth. Labor input biases of technical change are sub-
stantial in many industries. Labor-using, rather than labor-saving, biases 
predominate. Labor-using technical change will continue to be a stimulus 
to the growth of labor demand, and differences in the biases for different 
industries will play an important role in the reallocation of labor. 
We incorporate the determinants of long-term labor supply and 
demand into a model of U.S. economic growth. We refer to this model 
as the IGEM,1 which stands for the Inter-temporal General Equilibrium 
Model. Markets for labor, capital, and the aggregate output of the econ-
omy equilibrate through the price system at each point of time. In the 
labor market, for example, wage rates determine the labor supplied by 
the current population and the labor quantity demanded by employers 
in the many sectors of the economy. In the IGEM model and in the U.S. 
economy, year-to-year changes in the level of economic activity are pri-
marily the consequence of the accumulation of capital. However, over the 
next quarter-century the driving forces of economic growth are projected 
to be demography and technology—as encapsulated in the neoclassical 
theory of economic growth.
In the IGEM, capital formation is determined by the equilibration of 
saving and investment. We model household saving at the level of the 
individual household. Consumption, labor supply, and saving for each 
household are chosen to maximize a utility function, deﬁ   ned as the 
stream of future consumption of goods and leisure, subject to an inter-
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temporal budget constraint. The forward-looking character of savings 
decisions allows changes in future prices and rates of return to affect the 
current labor supply. The availability of capital input in the U.S. economy 
is the consequence of past investment. This backward-looking feature of 
capital accumulation links current markets of capital input to past invest-
ment decisions. 
II.  A Long-Run Model of the U.S. Economy and the U.S. Labor Market 
Our household model generates demand for a detailed list of personal 
consumption expenditures given in Table 6.1. Household preferences 
are structured in a nested, or tiered, manner. At the top tier, utility is a 
function of non-durable goods, capital services, consumer services, and 
leisure. Lower tiers allocate non-durable goods to speciﬁ  c categories, like 
food and clothing, and consumer services to transportation, ﬁ  nance, and 
other services. Household consumption patterns for goods and leisure 
are derived from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).2 The items 
in Table 6.1 are based on the consumption categories in the National 
Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs).3 These items are linked to the 
supplying industries listed in Table 6.2. 
As the owner of the economy’s wealth, the household sector makes 
a second contribution to the demand side of the economy through the 
demand for investment goods. Household sector  savings are allocated 
between domestic and foreign investment, and the domestic portion is 
distributed among investments in assets such as building structures, capi-
tal equipment, consumer durables, and inventories. Capital stocks and 
capital services are derived primarily from the Fixed Asset Accounts of 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis,4 which include information on invest-
ment by 60 asset categories. Data on labor input by industry are derived 
from detailed demographic and wage data in the annual Current Popula-
tion Surveys and the decennial Censuses of Population, as described by 
Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2005).  
We separate the production sector in the IGEM into 35 individual 
industries. The complete list is given in Table 6.2, together with the value 
of each industry’s output in 2000 and the corresponding Standard Indus-
trial Classiﬁ   cation codes. Each industry produces output from labor, Table 6.1
Personal Consumption Expenditures and leisure, IGEM categories, 2000. 
Leisure, IGEM Categories, 2000




































Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and Consumer Expenditure Survey (U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics).
Note: National Income and Product Accounts Personal Consumption Expenditure 
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Rubber and Plastic
Leather Products
Stone, Clay, and Glass
Primary Metals
Fabricated Metals
Industrial Machinery and 
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capital, and intermediate inputs, using a technology that allows for sub-
stitution among these inputs. Although technology can be represented 
by means of a production function, we ﬁ  nd it much more convenient to 
use a dual approach, based on a price function that gives each sector’s 
output price as a function of its input prices. Technologies are structured 
in a nested or tiered manner, with intermediate inputs divided between 
energy and materials; both energy and materials are further subdivided 
among inputs that correspond to the 35 commodity groups produced by 
the 35 industries.
Our representation of the technology embedded in each sector includes 
its respective rate and biases of technical change. The rate of technical 
change captures improvements in productivity or growth in output per 
unit of input. The biases of technical change correspond to increases or 
decreases in the shares of inputs in the value of output, holding input 
prices constant. The evolution of patterns of production reﬂ  ects both 
price-induced substitution among inputs and the impact of changes in 
technology. We project the historical patterns of technical change repre-
sented in our database in order to incorporate future changes in technol-
ogy into the demand for inputs of labor, capital, and intermediate goods 
and services. 
The production of each commodity by one or more of the 35 U.S. 
domestic industries is augmented by imports of that commodity from 
the rest of the world to generate the U.S. domestic supply of goods and 
services. This supply is allocated to U.S. industries as an intermediate 
input and to ﬁ  nal demand for consumption by U.S. households and gov-
ernments; investments by U.S. businesses, households, and governments; 
and net exports. Since imports are not perfect substitutes for commodities 
produced domestically, we also explicitly model the substitution between 
imports and domestic production. The rest of the world absorbs exports 
from the United States, and the net ﬂ  ow of resources in each period is 
governed by an exogenously speciﬁ  ed current account deﬁ  cit.
The ﬁ  nal sector explicitly considered in our model is the government 
sector, which taxes, spends, and makes transfer payments. Public con-
sumption of goods and services is one component of ﬁ  nal demand, while 
public sector borrowing is one of the uses of private savings. The ﬂ  ow of 
goods and factors among the four sectors of the U.S. economy—house-
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hold, business ﬁ   rms, government, and net exports to the rest of the 
world—is illustrated in Figure 6.1. Prices adjust to equate the supply 
from domestic and foreign producers to the demand from households, 
investors, government, and exports in each period. 
Our model of the U.S. economy is implemented econometrically. 
Parameters describing the behavior of producers and consumers are 
estimated statistically from a data set that we have constructed speciﬁ  -
cally for this purpose. These data are based on a new system of national 
accounts that integrates the wealth accounts with the National Income 
and Product Accounts.5 The capital accounts include investment goods, 
capital services, capital stocks, and the corresponding prices. These data 
are described in detail by Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2005). Similar data 
have recently been released for members of the European Union by the 
EU KLEMS project.6  
III.  Exogenous Variables in the Projections
Our model of the U.S. economy simulates the future growth and struc-
ture of the economy over the intermediate term of 25 years. Of course, 
our model’s time path of outcomes is conditional on projections of exog-
enous variables. Among the most important of these variables are the 
Figure 6.1 
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total population, the time endowment of the working-age population, 
the overall government deﬁ  cit, the current account deﬁ  cit, world price 
levels, and U.S. government tax policies. Many of these variables are 
developed from published sources, “ofﬁ  cial” and otherwise. In addition, 
we project the evolution of technology in each of the 35 industries that 
make up the model’s production sector. These variables are projected 
from the historical data set that underlies the production model and its 
estimation.
The key exogenous variables that describe the growth and composition 
of the U.S. population are population projections by sex and individual 
year of age from the U.S. Census Bureau.7 During the sample period the 
U.S. population is allocated to educational attainment categories using 
data from the Current Population Survey8 in a way that is parallel to our 
calculation of labor input. Each adult is given a time endowment of 14 
hours a day to be used for work and leisure. The number of hours for 
each sex-age-education category is weighted by labor compensation rates 
and aggregated to form the national time endowment presented in Figure 
6.2. 
Our projections use Census Bureau forecasts by sex and age. We assume 
that the educational attainment of those aged 35 or younger will be the 
same in the projected period as in the last year of the historical sample 
period; that is, a person who becomes 22 years old in 2014 will have the 
same chance of having a bachelor’s degree as a person in 2004. Those 
aged 55 years and over carry their educational attainment with them as 
they age; that is, the educational distribution of 70-year-olds in 2014 is 
the same as that of 60-year-olds in 2004. Those between 35 and 55 years 
of age have a complex adjustment that is a mixture of these two assump-
tions to allow a smooth improvement of educational attainment that is 
consistent with the observed proﬁ  le in 2004. The result of these calcula-
tions, shown in Figure 6.2, is that the U.S. population is expected to grow 
at just under 1 percent per year through 2030, reaching a level slightly 
in excess of 365 million inhabitants. The gradually slowing improve-
ment in the average level of educational attainment implies that the time 
endowment grows at a modestly faster rate of around 1 percent through 
2030. 
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We project productivity growth for each of the 35 industries, using 
the state-space approach of Jin and Jorgenson (2007). To illustrate this 
approach, Figure 6.3 gives historical data for the period 1960–2004, 
based on the estimates of Jorgenson, Ho, Samuels, and Stiroh (2007). 
These data update and revise the estimates of Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh 
(2005). Figure 6.4 presents projections of productivity growth for the 
period 2004–2030, using the state-space approach. Positive productivity 
growth reduces output prices, relative to costs of inputs, while negative 
growth raises output prices relative to costs. 
For 2004–2030 our baseline projections reveal steadily improving 
productivity in 30 of the 35 sectors in the IGEM. Electrical machinery, 
which contains electronic components such as the semiconductor devices 
used in computers and telecommunications equipment, leads the list in 
projected productivity growth. Although this industry’s projected pro-
ductivity growth rate exceeds 3 percent, this represents a slight reduc-
tion in the rate of productivity growth of just under 4 percent for the 
Figure 6.2 
Population and Household Time Endowment for the United States
Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey of U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
and the Current Population Survey from the U.S. Census.
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historical period 1960–2004. Non-electrical machinery, including com-
puters, has the second highest rate of productivity growth in both the 
historical period and the projection period, but the projected growth rate 
between 2004 and 2030 is considerably lower than the historical rate.
Below we show that the overall rates of productivity growth projected 
for the U.S. economy are substantially below those attained for the his-
torical period 1960–2004. It is also important to recognize productivity 
losses as well as productivity gains at the industry level. There are sev-
eral sectors with negative projected productivity growth, including the 
very large construction industry and the relatively small tobacco industry. 
Both industries also have declining productivity during the 1960–2004 
sample period.
Projections of the input biases are accomplished in a similar manner 
to the projections obtained for productivity. Figure 6.5 gives historical 
data for the period 1960–2004, while Figure 6.6 gives our projections for 
the period 2004–2030. Recall that the deﬁ  nition of skill-biased technical 
change is the effect of changes in technology on the share of labor input 
in the value of industry output, holding prices of labor input, as well as 
capital, energy, and materials inputs, constant. It is important to keep 
in mind that we have ﬁ  tted and projected biases of technical change for 
capital, energy, and materials inputs, as well as labor input, but these are 
not presented in this paper due to space considerations.
During the historical sample period of 1960–2004, technical change 
is predominantly labor-using rather than labor-saving. Metal mining, a 
relatively small industry, has a very large labor-using bias of technical 
change, while coal mining has a large labor-saving bias. Biases of techni-
cal change differ substantially among industries, and both labor-using 
and labor-saving changes occur with some frequency. It is important to 
project rates of technical change to determine the growth rate of individ-
ual industries and the economy as a whole. However, it is also important 
to project biases of technical change in order to capture the impact of 
changes in technology on the distribution of labor input among sectors. 
Two other important assumptions that determine the shape of the econ-
omy are the government and trade deﬁ  cits. Our projection of the govern-
ment deﬁ  cit follows the forecasts of the Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce for 
the next 10 years, and then is set on course to a zero balance by 2030.9 
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The current account deﬁ  cit is assumed to shrink steadily, relative to the 
GDP, so that it also reaches a sustainable balance by 2030. These simpli-
fying assumptions allow the simulation to produce a smooth time path. 
The government and current account deﬁ  cits are determinants of long-
run growth to the extent that these deﬁ  cits inﬂ  uence capital formation, 
but are substantially less important than the exogenous demographic and 
technology variables we have described. 
IV.  Projection of U.S. Economic Growth 
Our baseline path for the U.S. economy generates a labor force participa-
tion rate, deﬁ  ned as the ratio of labor input to the time endowment. We 
have used this to extrapolate the ratio of hours worked to discretionary 
hours available from the working age population. The participation rate 
presented in Figure 6.7 reached a peak in 2000, before the shallow reces-
sion of 2001 and the “jobless” recovery that followed. The historical 
Figure 6.7 
U.S. Labor Participation Rates and Real Wages, 1960–2004, with 
Projection to 2030
Source: Current Population Survey and U.S. Census Bureau.
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data from 1960 to 1990 show substantial gains in labor force participa-
tion. No such gains in participation are in prospect for the next quarter-
century. At the same time, projections beginning in 2004 do not suggest 
a large decline in labor force participation. 
It is important to keep in mind that the rate of population growth 
will be declining throughout the projection period of 2004–2030. The 
U.S. working-age population will be growing at a very similar rate to 
the population as a whole during our projection period. During the 
1960–2004 historical period, the working-age population grew consider-
ably more rapidly than the U.S. population as a whole. Finally, the time 
endowment, which adjusts the population for changes in composition 
by educational attainment and labor market experience, will continue to 
grow more rapidly than the working-age population. However, changes 
in composition will gradually disappear as average levels of education 
and experience stabilize. 
Real wages, deﬁ  ned as the ratio of the price of labor input to the price 
of consumption goods and services, are also presented in Figure 6.7. Con-
trary to historical trends often described in the popular business press, 
real wages have risen steadily throughout the postwar period with espe-
cially rapid growth rates during the period 1995–2004. Our projections 
of real wages rise steadily during the period 2004–2030, but at a decreas-
ing rate. This declining rate of increase mimics the historical data from 
1973–1995, prior to the U.S. growth resurgence that began around 1995 
and continued into the 2000–2004 period. A slowdown in the growth 
rate of real wages will occur despite the continuation of historical pro-
ductivity trends summarized in section III. 
We next turn to the sources of U.S. economic growth during the his-
torical and projection periods. Figure 6.8 presents historical data on 
the sources of U.S. economic growth during 1960–2004 recently com-
piled by Jorgenson, Ho, Samuels, and Stiroh (2007). The overall rate of 
growth is an impressive 3.34 percent per year. The most important source 
of growth is capital input, which contributes 1.70 percent or well over 
half of growth during the historical period. The next most important 
source of growth is labor input, which contributes 0.95 percent per year. 
These contributions are the growth rates of capital and labor inputs, each 
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weighted by the corresponding share in the value of output. Total factor 
productivity growth contributes 0.69 percent per year or slightly more 
than 20 percent of growth during the historical period. 
We project that the growth of the U.S. economy during the 2004–2030 
period will be only 1.61 percent per year. The contribution of capital 
input will remain the most important source of growth at 0.74 percent 
per year. The growth of total factor productivity will decline very slightly 
to 0.44 percent per year, and will outstrip the sharply lower contribu-
tion of labor input of 0.42 percent. While the contributions of capital 
and labor inputs will still greatly predominate among the sources of U.S. 
economic growth, the relative importance of total factor productivity 
growth will jump substantially. This reﬂ  ects the strength of the projected 
productivity trends described in section III. 
Figure 6.8 
Sources of U.S. Economic Growth
Source: Current Population Survey, Fixed Asset Accounts and National Product 
Accounts of U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, and U.S. Census Bureau.
Average annual growth (percent)
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We conclude our discussion of projected U.S. economic growth with 
a description of the growth of output and labor input at the industry 
level. Figure 6.9 presents growth rates of labor input for each of the 35 
industries in the IGEM during the historical period 1960–2004. Slightly 
less than half the industries experienced an increase in labor input, led 
by personal and business services. However, many industries experienced 
sharp declines in labor input, led by leather and leather products, apparel 
and textile products, and gas utilities. The growth rate of labor input 
overall was 1.64 percent per year. 
We have projected a substantial slowdown in the growth rate of labor 
input for the projected 2004–2030 period to 0.70 percent per year. Fig-
ure 6.10 provides a breakdown by industries. Positive growth in labor 
input predominates in the projections. Relatively small sectors with low 
projected productivity growth like tobacco and petroleum reﬁ  ning will 
show substantial increases in labor input. As widely anticipated, the large 
service sectors like ﬁ  nance, insurance, and real estate, will greatly pre-
dominate in the growth of labor input. Primary metals and metal min-
ing will continue to release labor input to a future U.S. economy that is 
increasingly constrained by the slow growth of the labor supply. 
Labor input biases are an important component of changes in demand 
for labor input. Labor-using technical change results in an increase in the 
share of labor input, holding prices of labor, capital, energy, and materi-
als inputs constant. This effect dominates in our projections, as well as in 
the sample period. The share of labor input in instruments will increase 
by 0.06 during the projection period 2004–2030, reversing a similar 
decline in the share of labor input during the sample period 1960–2004. 
Metal mining, a small sector that had a large labor-using bias of technical 
change during the historical sample period, has a smaller labor-using bias 
during the projection period. Biases of technical change are an important 
component of labor input demand, along with the steady rise in the price 
of labor input relative to other inputs. 
Growth in industry output completes our picture of future U.S. eco-
nomic growth.
Figure 6.11 gives historical data on output growth for the period 
1960–2004. Economic growth during the period 1960–2004 differed 
widely among industries, with a relatively narrow range of industries 
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exceeding the economy-wide average of 3.22 percent. As expected, the 
rapidly growing sectors were led by electrical machinery, including elec-
tronic components. Substantial growth also took place in three industries, 
non-electrical machinery, which contains computers; communications, 
the largest consuming sector for information technology equipment and 
software; and instruments, another major consumer. Only three indus-
tries experienced declining output growth—leather and leather products, 
gas utilities, and tobacco manufactures. 
Figure 6.12 gives U.S. economic growth during the projection period 
2004–2030.
Again, growth rates will differ substantially among industries, with 
electrical machinery exhibiting growth at the very rapid pace of more 
than 6 percent per year, comparable to the historical period of 1960–
2004. Most of the remaining industries, including non-electrical machin-
ery, one of the stars of the historical period, will scale back growth in the 
projection period. The relatively small leather industry will reverse the 
negative growth of the historical period and exceed the economy-wide 
average of 1.50 percent. 
V.  Summary and Conclusions 
Our ﬁ  rst and most important conclusion is that future supply and demand 
for labor in the U.S. economy will be driven by demography and technol-
ogy. The supply side of the labor market will be dominated by the slow-
down in the growth of the U.S. working-age population, partly offset by 
continuing increases in the quality of labor input due to rising average 
levels of educational attainment and experience. From 1960 to 1990 the 
participation rate of the working-age population increased fairly steadily 
as more women joined men as participants in the labor market. No such 
increases in labor force participation are in prospect for our projection 
period of 2004–2030. 
The widely discussed aging of the labor force is reﬂ  ected in the slowing 
growth of the working-age population, relative to the total U.S. popula-
tion. The working-age population will continue to expand more rapidly 
than the population as a whole, and labor force participation rates will 
decline very slowly. However, the slowdown in the growth of the time Labor Supply and Labor Demand in the Long Run 304
endowment will reduce the growth rate of the U.S. economy very sub-
stantially. This will be reinforced by the decline in investment and growth 
of capital input that will accompany the slow growth of labor supply. It 
is important to keep in mind that in the neoclassical theory of economic 
growth embodied in the IGEM, the growth of capital input is endog-
enous and is equal to the growth of output in the long run.10
Finally, future productivity growth will remain robust, despite waves of 
technological pessimism that sometimes accompany cyclical downturns. 
Rapid changes in technology will continue to be concentrated in the 
industries that produce information technology equipment and software, 
led by electrical machinery, the industry that includes electronic compo-
nents like semiconductors. This industry has had very rapid growth of 
total factor productivity or output per unit of unit, throughout the his-
torical period 1960–2004. We project that this will continue for the next 
quarter-century, although the speciﬁ  c form of the underlying changes in 
technology will undergo the same dramatic evolution as in the recent 
past.
At the level of individual industries, the demand for labor depends 
not only on the growth of output and the substitution of capital input 
for labor input, but also on the character of technical change. We have 
emphasized the wide variations in rates of productivity growth among 
industries. However, labor demand at the industry level is also strongly 
affected by biases of technical change. We have focused attention in labor-
saving and labor-using biases for each of the 35 industries in the IGEM. 
We have assessed the importance of these biases during the historical 
period 1960–2004, and projected these biases for the 2004–2030 pro-
jected period. Part of the growth of labor input in industries like instru-
ments, tobacco, coal mining, and communications will be due to ongoing 
labor-using biases.
In summary, the potential growth of the U.S. economy will be slowing 
considerably between 2004 and 2030, and monetary policy will have to 
adapt to the new environment.  The changes we have projected embody 
many features of the future labor market that are well known to econo-
mists and monetary policymakers—slowing population growth, partic-
ularly for the working-age population, and declining growth in labor 
quality. We have quantiﬁ  ed these factors by relying on ofﬁ  cial population 
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projections from the Census Bureau and our own estimates of labor qual-
ity growth. This data has enabled us to characterize the future growth of 
labor supply with some precision. 
The future growth of the U.S. economy depends on the contribution 
of labor input, that is, the growth rate of labor input multiplied by the 
labor share of output. However, future growth also depends on the rate of 
growth of total factor productivity and the contribution of capital input. In 
the neoclassical theory of growth embodied in the IGEM, the contribution 
of capital input, the growth rate of capital input multiplied by the capital 
share, is endogenous. To a reasonable approximation, growth rates of out-
put and capital input must converge in the long run. The only component 
of the sources of growth not yet accounted for is productivity growth.
We have projected future productivity growth on the basis of the his-
torical data on productivity growth constructed by Jorgenson, Ho, Sam-
uels, and Stiroh (2007). We have augmented this description of future 
changes in technology at the level of individual industries by estimating 
and projecting labor-saving and labor-using biases of technical change. 
This enables us to conclude that future productivity growth during the 
next quarter-century will be substantially less than productivity growth 
during our historical period of 1960–2004. This completes our analysis 
of labor demand and its distribution by industry. 
Economists and policymakers, especially in the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, have made important contributions to our present understanding of 
the role of technology in the evolution of labor demand and the growth 
of the U.S. economy.11 The remaining challenge will be to build the new 
understanding of technology and the sources of economic growth into the 
framework for the conduct of monetary policy. This new policy frame-
work can be erected on the solid foundation provided by projections of 
future demographic change. The new framework will be an important 
addition to the Federal Reserve’s highly successful policy structure for 
understanding and mitigating the impact of the business cycle. 
Notes
1. Detailed information about earlier versions of the IGEM and a survey of 
applications are available in Jorgenson (1998).Labor Supply and Labor Demand in the Long Run 306
2.  See http://www.bls.gov/cex/home.htm. Detailed documentation for the CEX is 
available at http://www.bls.gov/cex/home.htm#publications.
3. See http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm. Detailed documentation for the 
NIPAs is available at http://www.bea.gov/methodologies/index.htm.
4. See http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#ﬁ   xed. Detailed documentation 
for the Fixed Assets Accounts is available at http://www.bea.gov/methodologies/
index.htm.
5.  See Jorgenson and Landefeld (2006). 
6. See http://www.euklems.net/. This data set was released on March 15, 2007, 
and is described in “Use IT or Lose It,” The Economist, May 19–25, 2007, p. 
82. 
7. See: http://www.census.gov/popest/estimates.php. Historical data are taken 
from http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/. These population data are revised 
to match the latest censuses (e.g., 1981 data is revised to be consistent with the 
1990 Census).
8. See  http://www.census.gov/cps/.
9. See  www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm.
10. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2008) have pointed out the implications of this 
fact for growth in an intermediate run of ten years.
11. An excellent summary of this research is provided by Oliner, Sichel, and 
Stiroh (2007). The implications for monetary policy are discussed by Chairman 
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 Comments on “U.S. Labor Supply and 
Demand in the Long Run” by Dale W. 
Jorgenson et al.
Richard Berner
Dale Jorgenson has given us an important paper, describing and using 
a long-term model of the U.S. economy that can inform our judgment 
about potential growth and the factors behind these predictions. The 
news is not good. Over the 2004–2030 period that Jorgenson uses for 
this projection, potential U.S. economic growth plummets to just over 
1.5 percent per year.  
There are two factors at work behind this forecast:
1.  Jorgenson projects slower growth in the U.S. labor supply, resulting 
from the now-familiar combination of slowing population growth and 
the reduced labor force participation that accompanies an aging 
population.
2. Jorgenson is a self-proclaimed productivity and technology opti-
mist. But the projected pace of productivity growth is slower between 
2004 and 2030 than in the 1990s, when information technology 
posted very impressive gains. In part, this slower predicted growth is 
because in many key industries, the bias in technical change is labor-
using, not labor-saving.
We now know about the consequences of the demographic transition 
if cohort participation rates stay on current trends. Growth optimists 
were hoping that high rates of productivity growth would bail us out. 
Dale’s work in this paper argues that this scenario won’t take place.
Nonetheless, is there any hope for aging societies and their economic 
prospects? 
Let’s ﬁ  rst consider productivity. I am concerned that over the next 
25 years, productivity growth in the United States may slow, but I’m Labor Supply and Labor Demand in the Long Run 310
not sure that Dale’s estimates conclusively prove the case. Much of my 
skepticism about those estimates revolves around the poor quality of the 
output data available for certain economic sectors, and for overall and 
sectoral compensation; my doubt is not a criticism of Dale’s model or 
econometrics. The data indicate that construction productivity has been 
declining almost monotonically, and especially since the 1990s real estate 
bust. I ﬁ  nd this hard to believe. Likewise, the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 
programs have simply not kept up with the changing structure of worker 
compensation. Finally, because the estimates of biases in technical change 
are based on factor prices, including wages and salaries, I think we should 
take them with a grain of salt. 
Turning next to labor supply, I think the debate about whether labor 
force participation for older cohorts will increase or decline in the future 
is still a wide open question. It is clear that only heroic increases in the 
labor force participation of older American adults will offset population 
aging. But several factors may inﬂ  uence just such a change, including the 
fact that the next wave of retirees will come from the baby boom genera-
tion, and this group has a habit of upending expectations and rewrit-
ing the rules. There are three traditional legs to the retirement saving 
stool: 1) employer-sponsored pension plans, whether deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t or 
deﬁ  ned contribution plans like 401(k)s; 2) Social Security beneﬁ  ts; and 
3) other personal savings. Working longer, in my view, is the fourth criti-
cal leg, and future policy changes in Social Security and other retirement 
saving incentives do inﬂ  uence labor force participation. There is a ﬁ  fth 
leg: access to health insurance. Many older adults stay in the workforce 
to get healthcare coverage, and retire once they turn 65 years old and 
become eligible for Medicare. Thus any changes to health care ﬁ  nancing 
or Medicare have the potential to trigger signiﬁ  cant change in labor force 
behavior. 
In particular, the United States—and advanced countries generally—
might also look abroad for help in ﬁ  lling gaps in their labor supply. Such 
relief could come either from ﬂ  ows of immigration that might alter the 
nation’s demographic proﬁ  le, or from higher-return investments that will 
provide more income for retirement. Fallick and Pingle’s paper in this vol-
ume, and the work by Ralph C. Bryant and John F. Helliwell presented at 
Jackson Hole in 2004, both suggest that neither increased immigration nor 
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increased investment returns will be a complete panacea, but clearly each 
one can help improve the situation. Yet in the post-9/11 world, barriers 
to immigration are higher and could rise further still. Dale’s rudimentary 
and exogenous treatment of the “rest of the world” is probably worth 
enhancing to analyze those questions.
More broadly, because Jorgenson’s analysis focuses on the longer run, 
it seems critical to model the most important development in global labor 
markets of the past decade, namely the emergence of key Asian and other 
economies that are possessed of a rapidly expanding labor force, strong 
productivity growth, and high saving rates. As David Autor notes in his 
conference paper, we really do not know what impact offshoring has on 
the United States, and other industrial economy labor markets. Much 
more work is needed in this area if we are to accurately predict future 
labor ﬂ  ows. 
At the present time, however, we can say some things. I think that 
this positive supply shock has been disinﬂ  ationary—both through new 
sources of labor supply and the offshoring of some jobs. Of course, other 
factors, most importantly monetary policy, not just in the United States 
but around the world, have also been disinﬂ  ationary. So we don’t know 
the contributions of each factor. But the existence of such new sources of 
supply has put some pressure on both labor compensation and employ-
ment in both goods-producing and service-producing industries. This is 
because global connectivity means that workers engaged in a broad array 
of occupations can work effectively with both customers and colleagues 
several time zones removed. I know from personal experience that such 
arrangements work well, and that global companies are reckoning head-
count in terms of worldwide numbers. Just as with U.S. labor markets, 
the question in global labor markets is whether these will have their own 
demographic transition that could reverse, or at least partially unwind, 
the favorable supply shock of the last 10–15 years. 
I think it is quite likely that the currently favorable supply conditions 
in global labor markets will eventually experience some type of reversal, 
but it will take a long time for this shift to play out. To ﬁ  nd out how long 
this might take, it is worth looking at overseas labor markets to compare 
and contrast our own experience. In these remarks, I’ll look brieﬂ  y at 
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As you see in Figure 6.13, dependency ratios are rising across the 
board, but what may happen in China and India is especially important 
for how the global labor supply may play out in the next few decades. 
China’s dependency ratio, partly as a result of its one-child policy, likely 
will rise and eclipse our own around 2037. Labor force participation 
there may slow as the population ages, and China is developing a new 
pension system that may somewhat change labor force participation. In 
contrast, India has had no one-child policy, and its demographic transi-
tion toward an older population is a long way off. 
Figure 6.14 compares labor force participation and productivity across 
countries. The isoquants deﬁ  ne countries with the same GDP per capita. 
Note that in this ﬁ  gure, the hours worked data per capita is for the entire 
population, not just the workforce. French per capita GDP is below that 
in the United States, primarily because the French choose to work fewer 
hours per week. Yet productivity in France is actually very similar to U.S. 











1950 1975 2000 2025 2050
Figure 6.13 
Rising Dependency Rates: Ratio of Individuals Over 64 Years of Age to 
Individuals Aged 15 to 64 Years
Source: Australian Government, Intergenerational Report, 2007; Australian
Treasury projections and United Nations 2006 Revision Population Database,
medium variant projections; Morgan Stanley Research.
Percent
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American workweek more clearly. This difference famously reﬂ  ects cul-
tural differences, but it also reﬂ  ects labor market regulation. The policy 
message is that deregulation of labor markets abroad may reverberate 
in U.S. labor markets. Figure 6.16 shows how strong is the incentive 
to outsource in Asia and elsewhere based solely on wage differentials, 
although these data reﬂ  ect the Bureau of Labor Statistics’s deﬁ  nition of 
compensation on an hourly basis. U.S. compensation includes the ﬁ  xed 
cost of employer-provided healthcare, so deﬁ  ning it on an hourly basis 
may not be entirely accurate, but this won’t change the relative position 
here. The differences are still quite huge. Dale’s paper offers a rich menu 
for future research. Below I identify two key areas for further study that 
ﬂ  ows from the analysis presented in this paper.
1. The need to assess the impact policy changes may have on labor 
force participation and aggregate U.S. output. We know from Munnell 
Figure 6.14 
Labor Force Participation and Productivity: A Cross-Country Comparison
Source: Morgan Stanley Research; OECD Productivity Database, September 
2006.
Note: Average hours worked per person are calculated across the whole 
population, not just the labor force. Thus, the horizontal axis combines the 
population and participation components of the 3Ps. Countries on the same 
contour line have the same GDP per head.
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Figure 6.15 
Productivity Differences Between the French and American Workweeks, 
1960–2005
Source: Australian Federal Budget, 2007–2008, Statement No. 4,
http://www.budget.gov.au/2007-08/bp1/download/bp1_bst4.pdf; 
Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database, January 
2007; Morgan Stanley Research.
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and Sass’s paper and from Gene Steuerle’s work that changes in Social 
Security retirement ages and beneﬁ  ts, as well as the start of Medicare, 
induced important shifts in retirement decisions and in labor force 
participation among older workers. Will changes in the ﬁ  nancing of 
healthcare, such as proposals to tax employer-provided health beneﬁ  ts 
or proposals among the 2008 presidential candidates to ﬁ  nance U.S. 
healthcare outside of the workplace, induce signiﬁ  cant changes in U.S. 
labor force participation? Dale tells me that he is doing some work for 
the Department of Health and Human Services’ Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services along this line, which I applaud. Immigration 
and tax policies are also worth analyzing. 
2. The globalization of product and labor markets has been disinﬂ  a-
tionary for much of the last 10–15 years. I suspect that this situation 
will reverse, and changing demographics abroad, as well as the emer-
gence of giants like China and India, may play a role in that reversal. 
Over time, if these demographic transitions occur abroad, the disinﬂ  a-
Figure 6.16 
Global Wage Differentials for Manufacturing Workers, 2005
Source: Morgan Stanley Research, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Note: Asian NIEs (newly industrialized economies) include Hong Kong, Korea,
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tionary effect may reverse, and so an analysis of changing demograph-
ics abroad may play a role in that analysis. 
To conclude, I have a story that knits together thoughts about labor 
supply, incentives, cultural differences, and the risks of going global. It’s 
especially appropriate that a guy from Wall Street tells this anecdote.
An American investment banker was at the pier of a small coastal 
Greek village when a small boat with just one ﬁ  sherman docked. Inside 
the small boat were several large yellow ﬁ  n tuna. The American compli-
mented the ﬁ  sherman on the quality of his ﬁ  sh and asked, “How long 
does it take to catch them?” The ﬁ  sherman replied: “Only a little while.” 
The American then asked why didn’t he stay out longer and catch more 
ﬁ  sh? The Greek said he had enough to support his family’s immediate 
needs. The American then asked, “But what do you do with the rest of 
your time?” The Greek ﬁ  sherman said, “I sleep late, ﬁ  sh a little, play with 
my children, take siesta with my wife, Maria, stroll into the village each 
evening where I sip wine and play cards with my friends, I have a full and 
busy life.” The American scoffed, “I am a Harvard M.B.A. and I could 
help you. You should spend more time ﬁ  shing and with the proceeds, 
buy a bigger boat. With the proceeds from the bigger boat you could 
buy several boats, and eventually you would have a ﬂ  eet of ﬁ  shing boats. 
Instead of selling your catch to a middleman you would sell directly to 
the processor, eventually opening your own cannery. You would con-
trol the product, processing, and distribution. You would need to leave 
this small coastal ﬁ  shing village and move to Athens, then London, and 
eventually New York where you will run your expanding enterprise.” 
The Greek ﬁ  sherman asked, “But, how long will this all take?” To which 
the American replied, “15–25 years.” “But what then?” The American 
laughed and said that’s the best part. “When the time is right you would 
announce an initial public offering, sell your company stock to the pub-
lic, and become very rich—you would make millions.” “Millions ... then 
what?” The American said, “Then you would retire. Move to a small 
coastal ﬁ  shing village where you would sleep late, ﬁ  sh a little, play with 
your kids, take a siesta with your wife, stroll to the village in the evenings 
where you could sip wine and play cards with your friends.”
Comments on “U.S. Labor Supply and 
Demand in the Long Run” by Dale W. 
Jorgenson et al.
Erik Brynjolfsson
It’s been said that productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run, it’s 
almost everything. And there are few people, if any, who have made a 
greater contribution to our understanding of productivity growth than 
Dale Jorgenson, so it’s nice to have a few minutes of fame sharing the 
podium with him.
It’s fascinating to discuss U.S. labor supply and demand in the long 
run. We get to look way out into the future and speculate on what might 
be, which is always fun. Unlike Bob Hall’s business cycle weather predic-
tions, no one can really know for sure whether or not these estimates by 
Dale and his co-authors are going to come true for quite some time. But 
with that opening disclaimer, let me try to add some value to the discus-
sion of the issues surrounding future labor supply and demand. 
Brieﬂ  y, here’s a summary of some of the key takeaways from Dale 
and his co-authors’ work in this paper, and elsewhere, a lot of which is 
methodological. The Inter-temporal General Equilibrium Model (IGEM) 
that he has developed is very impressive, with its inclusion of thirty-ﬁ  ve 
industrial sectors in its number of inputs. As Dale mentioned, in the long 
run economic growth is really driven by demographics and technological 
change, his projections of which over the 2004–2030 period are being 
examined here. Quite a lot of effort went into that model and long-run 
projection, and he has harnessed an enormous amount of data that isn’t 
really very visible in the particular paper here at hand. You have to dive 
into a number of his other papers to see the enormous effort and technical 
detail that went into this model by Dale and a whole host of co-authors 
and other researchers, including related papers with Hui Jin and Kevin 
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to the U.S. economy to account for all the output from Dale’s research 
team.
In this paper, Dale goes ahead and estimates long-run U.S. labor 
demand and supply, using data he’s constructed based on the National 
Income and Production Accounts (NIPA), and calibrates these relation-
ships between the different sectors and the inputs, particularly on the 
price side. Dale then makes his projections based on certain exogenous 
variables, some of which we can pin down pretty well, like what will be 
happening to population growth and time endowment over time. Those 
variables are pretty much baked in already. But the projections also need 
to make some assumptions about what’s going to happen to the federal 
government deﬁ  cit (I’m glad to see that Dale thinks it is going to decline 
and go away), the current account deﬁ  cit, and some of the other most 
important macroeconomic variables moving forward. Dale’s collective 
research has really made a lot of contributions to predicting what will be 
happening with education, which really translates into labor quality and 
capital quality. When Dale gets his Nobel citation, I’m sure it’s going to 
prominently mention the contributions he has made to our understand-
ing that it is not just the quantity of capital and labor that matters, but it 
is the quality of these inputs that counts, which thanks to Dale are now 
important factors in everyone’s model of the aggregate economy.
Dale then projects the evolution to the economy that these technol-
ogy changes enable going forward. Again, you need to go to another 
paper of his to really understand and appreciate some of the novelty of 
what’s gone into this model and its projections. Dale just summarizes 
this research in a few sentences in this conference paper, but there is a 
tremendous amount of work that went into this model. His IGEM is a 
really dramatic extension of Bob Solow’s work—as Dale mentioned, 50 
years ago Bob developed the basic model of technological change that 
has really become the workhorse model of growth for economists. But 
if you want to understand input substitution in the various relationships 
between labor and capital, you can’t just have unbiased technical change 
in the way Bob Solow’s model includes it. You have to look at the bias of 
technical change for each of the different sectors, and that’s what Dale’s 
contribution has done. His IGEM is a very important innovation, and is 
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really going to be valuable for helping to address these questions about 
future labor supply and demand in the long run.
The key result, as Dale mentioned, is that we are going to have a 
signiﬁ  cant growth slowdown in a lot of the key input factors. Popula-
tion growth, labor force participation, and educational attainment are 
all slowing down. It’s hard to argue with any of these projections—you 
can quibble here and there on the margin, but the broad picture seems 
largely set in stone. Dale also sees a dramatic decline in investment growth 
and signiﬁ  cant multifactor productivity slowdowns. We can argue about 
whether that’s signiﬁ  cant or not, as in an early version of this paper he 
did not project much of a change. In this more recent version, the num-
bers have shown more of a decline, so maybe some of the text needs to 
match up with the numbers a little bit more on that score. But I think 
that the overall picture and the big takeaway is much slower growth is 
in the future for the U.S. economy. If you put all three together, slower 
labor supply growth, dramatically less investment, and signiﬁ  cantly lower 
multifactor productivity growth, you see that overall growth is less than 
half of what it was in the past, and that’s a function of all three of those 
factors, labor, capital, and productivity growth, interacting in his model. 
I’ll call this “the Great Slowdown,” as depicted in Figure 6.8 in Dale’s 
paper.
So that’s the summary and background; now for some comments. I’d 
like to be somewhat of an optimist, like Dale used to be in some of his 
earlier papers. So in thinking about what’s going forward, I’ll try to raise 
some questions that challenge these projections. Of course, it is much 
easier to be the critic on these sorts of things. 
Stability of the Parameters
One question I’ll raise is about the stability of the parameters used in 
the IGEM. Every forward-looking projection has to be estimated from 
the data we actually have in hand now. Since we do not have data on 
future years, we need to extrapolate from the historical data to project 
the future. This a natural thing to sort of do; for instance, to get future 
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past and are consuming now in order to predict what people like my sons 
will be buying in the year 2030, when they will be the prime-age consum-
ers. What my sons are consuming now—iPods, Xboxes, cell phones, and 
lots and lots of hours of instant text messaging—pretty much accounts 
for all of their disposable income and all of their disposable time, as far 
as I can tell. It’s an interesting market basket, because none of those items 
existed 25 years ago. The point is that right now I cannot predict exactly 
what my sons are going to be consuming in the year 2030—obviously 
some of it will be housing and food, and maybe some of the discretion-
ary consumer goods will be in keeping with the electronic technologies 
they are consuming today, but one would suspect that there is going to 
be a different consumption pattern and set of relationships. Now if you 
aggregate these predictions enough, maybe you can lump them all into 
some broad categories, but it is not so obvious that all these ﬁ  ne-grained 
parameters are going to stay the same, and we need to remember this. 
While it is important to try and predict the future in order to make better 
policy choices today, we have to also recognize that to some degree this is 
an exercise in uncertainty. Who would have predicted the radio in 1900, 
television in 1925, video cassette recorders in 1965, or iPods in 1985?   
Later this week, I’m going out to Cisco Systems to see this new product 
they call TelePresence, a virtual “in-person” communications system that 
they think is going to revolutionize the world. A TelePresence unit costs 
$300,000 and enables people to have meetings across great distances, 
which cuts down on travel and saves time. While it costs $300,000 now, 
you can be pretty sure that in the next 10 or 20 years it is going to cost 
a small fraction of that and will have similar or better capabilities. Is a 
TelePresence unit going to be a big part of the consumption bundle in the 
future, much like cell phones or personal computers are today? I would 
bet it may be a standard part of the consumer market basket in 20 years, 
even though it’s not today, and it could substitute for or complement 
other things today.
Even aside from the uncertaintly about the future substitution relation-
ships among speciﬁ  c components, the unfortunate reality is that the key 
variables moved around quite a bit in the past. Take productivity growth, 
which has bounced around quite a bit over the last couple decades. Dale 
referred to the pessimism people have with the latest downturn, but over 
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periods of 10 or 20 years we have seen a doubling or a tripling of key 
productivity numbers. Surprisingly, in some cases the numbers change 
even for the exact same year. That happens because of revisions to earlier 
data. In one of his previous papers, Dale pointed out that for the year 
1996, the data were revised to show that productivity growth moved 
from 0.8 to 2.7 percent. So you’ve got to take these past numbers with 
some pretty broad conﬁ  dence bounds, and some of them with a grain of 
salt. But again, I’m being the critic here, which is a very easy task. Yet it 
is very difﬁ  cult to come up with an alternative approach to the one Dale 
offers here, as you need to work with the data you have in hand. But I 
think that bearing in mind how these numbers can change just makes you 
want to be a little cautious about how precise you are about the predic-
tions made going forward. 
Price Identiﬁ  cation
Another key issue is price identiﬁ  cation, which is critical to this type of 
analysis. Estimating price effects at the intersection of supply and demand 
is the canonical example of problems introduced from simultaneity. It’s a 
very tough question to sort out, rather like the chicken-and-the-egg issue 
of which factor really determines the outcome of the other one. Dale 
does a fantastic job of using instrumental variables to address these issues 
of simultaneity—he works out these details in some of the companion 
papers to the IGEM that he pointed me to. While his instruments pass 
all the statistical tests, I can’t help but feel this nagging sense that I’m 
not fully understanding the model, because some of the correlations just 
seem a little unexpected. For instance, Dale mentions that increased price 
tends to be correlated with more technological change, such that this 
technology input is used more and more. That seems pretty counterintui-
tive to me—why would higher prices increase demand?—although that’s 
what the data say. It seems plausible that instead there’s some causality 
going the other direction, with higher demand leading to higher costs, as 
for instance when greater demand drives up wages in a technologically 
advancing sector. I’m not sure whether the technical change is leading to 
more demand for the input, which drives the price increases, but maybe 
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prices is that demand and supply tend to be much more elastic in the long 
run than in the short run. This raises some questions about which num-
bers are being used and how these are projected into the future. 
Adjustment Costs and Organizational Capital
Another issue is how you deal with adjustment costs and delays and 
the role of intangible capital. From my understanding of the model, it 
appears that the instant capital investments are made, these have effects 
on output and productivity, even before the capital is installed. Now it is 
difﬁ  cult to reconcile this assumption with certain categories of intangible 
capital investment like software and information technology. I’ve done a 
lot of work looking at enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems. For 
instance, Scientiﬁ  c-Atlanta, which is part of Cisco Systems, purchased a 
large ERP system in late 1994, spent a lot of money and time, and didn’t 
go live with it until 1997; even then, the ﬁ  rm really did not realize its 
full impact for several years after; see Figure 6.17. This kind of delay 
partly reﬂ  ects the complementary of these unmeasured investments in 
Figure 6.17 
Scientific-Atlanta Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) Timeline
Source: Aral, Sinan, Erik Brynjolfsson, and D. J. Wu. 2006. “Which Came
First, IT or Productivity? The Virtuous Cycle of Investment and Use in
































































intangible capital, which I have become very convinced is a huge factor 
in the economy even though we don’t measure this kind of intangible 
investment very well.
How do you measure things like organizational capital? I visited a 
Dell computer factory a few years ago which had doubled its output in 
response to increased demand. But the way they accomplished this was 
not by building a new factory next to the ﬁ  rst one. Instead, Dell installed 
some software to redesign their business processes, and by establishing 
electronic links to their suppliers and their customers, eliminated some 
of the work-in-process inventory. This set of changes allowed them to 
produce twice the output with the same bricks and mortar. So had they 
really built a second factory? Actually, yes. Dell did build a second fac-
tory, but it was made out of software and business processes, not bricks 
and mortar. They installed the organizational capital that was producing 
real output in the form of physical computers, which resulted in real mar-
ket value and real revenues. So in that sense, I think installing these new 
business processes constituted a real capital investment, but unfortunately 
this investment is not something that shows up in the conventional GDP 
Figure 6.18 
Investment Share of Information Technology (Percent of Private 
Nonresidential Fixed Investments)
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accounts as adding to the nation’s capital stock. This is not just an isolated 
story—you can look at many different examples from different ﬁ  rms, and 
see a similar pattern where hardware is just the visible tip of the iceberg 
that involves much larger investments like process engineering and human 
capital investment. These intangible capital investments actually account 
for the bulk of this capital investment, which I estimate is on the order of 
$2 trillion of information technology-related and computer- related intan-
gible assets that as a nation we have built up in recent years.
Pessimism on Productivity
In this paper, Dale and his team are very pessimistic on future U.S. pro-
ductivity gains given some of the other numbers generated in his model’s 
projections. I got the sense that the role of multifactor productivity is 
grinding to a stop in their model. They don’t provide exact numbers for 
the year 2030, when the projections end, but over the 2004–2030 period 
productivity is slowing down markedly. 
But has productivity growth in the United States has been slowing 
down historically? If anything, there has been an upsurge in the last 
decade or so, which in large part reﬂ  ects gains from information tech-
nology. It may be that to calibrate their neoclassical model they need to 
make some kinds of steady-state assumptions that eliminate the role of 
exogenous productivity growth. But I’m not sure exactly how this works 
through their model, and that is something I would be interested in hear-
ing more about in Dale’s response. This model’s predictions of declining 
future productivity growth are certainly much more pessimistic than the 
projections made by a lot of other people who have looked forward, 
albeit with less elaborate and less sophisticated models. If you look at 
the bottom line here, for a ten-year period going forward, one of Dale’s 
earlier papers with Min Ho and Kevin Stiroh estimated multifactor pro-
ductivity growth at about 0.91 percent, which is a bit more than double 
what it is in the current paper. To square it with the slowdown Dale now 
anticipates for the next 30 years, maybe all of the projected slowdown in 
the new paper happens after the next 10 years. 
Similarly, the paper sees real wages as kind of hitting the ceiling, as 
you can see in Figure 6.7 of Dale’s paper. Real wages rise, but at an ever-
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declining rate over the 2004–2030 period. Again, from the paper I get the 
sense this is because of the assumption that long-run capital growth has 
to equal output growth over time, so you’re going to have this asymp-
tote. But I think this prediction may depend on where that asymptote 
is located. Are we approaching this point in the twenty-ﬁ  rst century or 
sometime in the thirty-ﬁ  rst century? I’m not sure, and in my opinion that 
obviously is going to have a big effect on when we’re going to start seeing 
this kind of tailing off. 
To extrapolate these trends that drive the model, we need to speculate 
on what’s going to happen going forward with information technology 
and labor demand. A big question is whether or not this trend of produc-
tivity gains from advances in information technology is going to continue 
for the next 25 years. Dale predicts that productivity growth in infor-
mation technology equipment and software will be slower than it was 
historically over the 1960–2004 period, especially in the computer sector 
(which is called “non-electrical machinery,” ironically). Understanding 
the “why” behind the trend, as Lisa Lynch mentioned the other day and 
like the work that David Autor presented yesterday, is especially impor-
tant when applied to these potential future outcomes. 
Today, we have more and more computer applications that are “intel-
ligent,” from computer chess grand masters to software agents rec-
ommending books to different kinds of robots. Interestingly, in many 
cases, these applications were made possible simply because of increases 
computational power. This is useful to know, because improvements in 
computer power, not just microprocessors and memory, but also in hard 
drives and other components, are highly predictable. Moore’s Law, the 
doubling of processor power every 18 months, has held for nearly 40 
years. Computer scientists and engineers are conﬁ  dent that it will con-
tinue for at least another decade, and most think longer than that. 
If information technology does continue to post gains as seen in the 
past, we will start hitting some key thresholds. For example, a lot of the 
reason that today’s computers can’t do tasks like using vision to recognize 
objects as well as a two-year-old human is because our brains are simply 
much more powerful at the necessary raw computations than comput-
ers. The vision centers of our brains have billions of processors that are 
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that ability in computers, it turns out that today’s machines do not have 
the same level of computational power as the human brain. But that’s 
not going to be true if these information technology trends continue for 
another decade or two. By then, we may actually have a level of compu-
tational power that by today’s standard falls into the category of things 
that only humans can do. That will result in a fundamental change in the 
way the economy works.
Assuming that within the next three decades we will get to this point 
is a more optimistic scenario than the one Dale presented. In addition, it 
is quite possible not only that the underlying trends in productivity will 
continue, but also that the factor share of information technology will 
continue to grow. Historically, information technology has become a big-
ger and bigger share of the economy, despite the rapidly falling prices of 
this technology. If this sector continues to take up a bigger share of the 
economy, then we are going to have not only rapid productivity growth 
Figure 6.19 
Moore’s Law and Computer Investments, 1970–2005
Source: Grove, A. S. 1990. “The Future of the Computer Industry.” California
Management Review 33(1): 148–60, and company data. Trend lines are authors’
estimates.
Note: P6 and P7 microprocessors and 256M, 1G, and 4G DRAMs are estimated 
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in the related sectors, but this productivity gain is going to have a bigger 
overall weighted average affect on the economy. This effect will tend to 
raise the average productivity growth of the economy as a whole, above 
even its current growth rate.
Let me just close with a comment made by Todd Thompson, the for-
mer chief ﬁ  nancial ofﬁ  cer of Citigroup. When I asked him about whether 
he was going to be able to cut his information technology budget because 
of rapidly falling prices, he said, “Oh, I hope not. I’m already spending 
billions of dollars on technology, and I want to spend more.” And I said, 
why? You don’t have to pay as much any more for your computers as 
you used to, doesn’t that mean you can reduce their share of the bud-
get? Thompson replied that Citigroup wants to try and get as much of 
the rest of the ﬁ  rm’s labor force over onto the technology bandwagon, 
riding down the gains from Moore’s law. I think there are a lot of other 
executives out there who are actively trying to be creative about shifting 
labor to areas where it can be augmented or replaced with computer 
power. If they succeed, then instead of winding down, we can expect 
to maintain or even increase the productivity growth rates we’ve seen 
historically. 
Figure 6.20 
Value Added as a Nominal Percentage Share of GDP, 1960–2006, with 
Projection to 2030
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